

The political and kinetic effects of the 1977 immortal uprising of “Safar”



The scholar Dr. Sheikh Mohammed al-Hassoun
Professor of the Scientific Seminary (al-Hawzah)

Sheikh Abdul Halim al-Zuhairi

The political and kinetic effects of the 1977
immortal uprising of "Safar"
On the 40th anniversary of Imam Hussein -(peace
be upon him)- a documentary reading of its events

The scholar Dr. Sheikh Mohammed al-Hassoun/
Professor of the Scientific Seminary (al-Hawzah)

Sheikh Abdul Halim al-Zuhairi

7

**The political and kinetic effects of the 1977 immortal uprising of
"Safar"
On the 40th anniversary of Imam Hussein -(peace be upon him)- a
documentary reading of its events.**

The scholar Dr. Sheikh Mohammed al-Hassoun/ Professor of the Scientific
(Seminary (al-Hawzah)
Sheikh Abdul Halim al-Zuhairi

First Edition 2020

Measurement: 21× 14.5

Pages: 5

:Publishing and distribution by
RCD Rafidain Center for Dialogue



**all rights reserved for Rafidain Center for Dialogue RCD
It is not permissible to copy or republish without the written consent of
.the Center**

Contents

subject	page
About Al-Rafidain Center for Dialogue	5
Vision	7
The message	7
Objectives	7
means	8
Sheikh Mohammed Al-Hassoun	9
Interventions	22
Sheikh Abdul Hamlin Al-Zuhairi	41
Interventions	57

About Al-Rafidain Center for Dialogue

Al-Rafidain Center for Dialogue is one of the qualitative centers in Iraq, which brings together political, economic and academic elites which are active in guiding visions and influences in decision-making and public opinion.

It is an independent think tank, which promotes dialogues in political, cultural and economic affairs among Iraqi elites, with the aim of promoting democratic experience and achieving community peace, and helping state institutions develop themselves, by providing strategic expertise and insights, the center is a salon for dialogue that is objective and neutral which employs its outputs to pressure decision makers and direct public opinion towards building a state of institutions, within the framework of democratic system, the rule of law, and respect for human rights.

The center was established on February 1, 2014 in Najaf city in the form of a virtual group in cyberspace comprising a limited number of politicians, academics and intellectuals, and the idea developed later, to be legalized by registering the center in the NGO department of General Secretariat of the Iraqi Council of Ministers.

Today, the Rafidain Center for Dialogue brings together more than 700 Iraqi members from all political orientations, academic disciplines and religious denominations, as it can be likened to a "mini-Iraq" in which everyone agreed to adopt dialogue as a key pillar for addressing problems and producing strategic solutions, in harmony with the center's vision of building a prosperous nation. The administrative center also has 30 employees from different disciplines.

In a short time, the Center has been able to achieve a range of achievements by harnessing different energies and employing its outputs for the benefit of the Iraqi cause, taking advantage of modern technologies in electronic communication with the elites at the decision-making center and overcoming the barriers of geography, time and security imperatives, which may hinder direct dialogue.

The Centre not only engaged in electronic communication, but also set up a range of activities on the ground, including a number of seminars, conferences, workshops and specialized interactive sessions, including, but not limited to: The development of the banking sector and the

stock market, the ripening of national reconciliation projects, the mediation between the Government of the Centre and the government of the region during crises, the improvement of the service sectors, the elimination of administrative bureaucracy and routine, the achievement of water and food security, as well as the extrapolation of many thorny problems, such as the Constitution, petroleum, foreign relations, popular mobilization, border crossing points, investment, social welfare and others.

The Forum for Dialogue is a milestone in the Centre's activities, which is the first of its kind in Iraq, and the most extensive and structured, aimed at enriching dialogue among decision makers on issues of concern to the country, promoting discussions on them and exchanging experiences, experts and academics.

The vision of the center:

The center is the station at which the views of elites and decision makers converge in its entire political, religious and national spectrum, providing a positive interactive environment that improves the creation of common spaces and contributes to the building of a thriving country.

The message of the center:

Promoting and developing substantive and serious dialogues between ethnic elites and decision makers that enhance democratic experience, and achieve community peace and sustainable development in Iraq.

Objectives of the Centre:

The Center seeks to achieve a number of objectives, including:

- Achieving and sustaining social peace by promoting constructive dialogue and intellectual exchange among Iraqi elites within comprehensive national rules and frameworks.
- To promote a sense of national responsibility in society by making a public view towards sustaining democratic experience and maintaining a balanced relationship and mutual trust between elites on one hand and state organs and institutions on the other.
- Assist State institutions and bodies develop solutions to the problems facing their work by providing strategic studies, consultations and insights by specialized researchers.

- Expanding the base of commons between political and social entities by providing a neutral and objective dialogue environment that guides dialogue in the public interest of the nation and the citizen.

Means:

In order to achieve its objectives, the Centre uses the following methods:

- Holding conferences, seminars and specialized meetings in the political, social, economic and cultural fields, providing appropriate media coverage and following up on its outcomes.
- producing composed and translated books, magazines, newspapers, publications and research in Arabic or other languages, and publishing them in paper or electronically.
- Conclusion of agreements and partnerships for cooperation and the signing of memorandums of understanding with local and international institutions, organizations and centers with orientations and objectives similar to the center's.

- Concluding agreements with high-level universities and colleges in Iraq and abroad to hold joint scientific events that contribute to achieving the center's objectives.
- The establishment of scientific, intellectual and cultural research and studies departments, and the formation of specialized permanent or temporary committees, which strengthen the scientific research movement to contribute to achieving the center's objectives in issues concerning Iraq and the Middle East region.
- Holding dialogue and understanding sessions between different people whether they engage in ethnic, racial or political differences, to develop mechanisms for understanding the other as a prelude to discovering national commons and making them the starting point for a creative constructive dialogue for social integration.

(The political and kinetic effects of the 1977 immortal uprising of “Safar”. On the 40th anniversary of Imam Hussein -peace be upon him- a documentary reading of its events)

Sheikh Mohammad al-Hassoun

Biography of the Lecturer

His eminence sheikh Mohammad al-Hassoun

Born in Najaf, and completed his studies there, he entered Baghdad university faculty of engineering, then was displaced by the Baghdadi government to Iran with his family, so he studied at the scientific seminary (al-Hawzah) in the holy city of Qom, and attended top-level research by its senior revisers, specializing in the revival of linear heritage.

He’s made several impacts on authorship and investigation, including:

Detective al-Karaki Encyclopedia, in twelve volumes

Encyclopedia of Hussein Rituals, in ten volumes

He has extensive work in reporting, lecturing and attending scientific conferences in many countries of the world, and has visited twenty-seven countries in total

Now he’s heading The Ideological Research Center under The Office of Grand Ayatollah Sayyid al-Sistani in the holy city of Qom.

Distinguished and Virtuous Professors:

I am pleased and honored to welcome Dr. Sheikh Mohammed al-Hassoun to give a valuable lecture on the political and kinetic impact of the 1977 immortal uprising of “Safar” on the 40th anniversary of Imam Hussein (peace be upon him), may he please precede.

Sheikh Mohammad al-Hassoun:

In the name of God the Merciful, may peace be upon our prophet Mohammad and his family

Peace be upon you all brothers and sisters.

The topic of today’s lecture is about the uprising of “safir” on the 40th anniversary of Imam Hussein. I called it (The Uprising of the Holy “Najaf” in 1977 AD. 1397 Hijri)

First, let’s take a brief look at this uprising, perhaps some of the attendees and listeners may not have full knowledge of it.

In 1977, the Baathist regime prevented the people of Najaf from going to holy Karbala on foot to visit Imam Hussein (peace be upon him) as is customary every year, so the Hussein youth (owners of processions) decided to challenge the authority and go out in a solace procession to holy Karbala. The Authority had previously threatened to punish anyone who participates in this march and does so and so on.... But the youth came out, therefore consequences happened on the way to Karbala.

The political and kinetic effects of the 1977 immortal uprising of “Safar”. On the 40th anniversary of Imam Hussein -peace be upon him- a documentary reading of its events.

The Baathist regime attacked and arrested the visitors (al-Husseini youth) on their way to Karbala, using army and police forces, we will touch on it in details later, the visitors were imprisoned in prison No. 1 in Camp al-Rasheed, and then they came to court, ten of them were

sentenced to death, fifteen of them got life imprisonment, and the rest of the detainees were released.

There were important events in this uprising, including the arrest of Sayyid Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim and sentencing him for life, whereas the Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei sent a delegation and a letter to Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr to commute the sentences of detainees.

After the death sentences were handed down, a number of supreme leaders and scholars denounced these sentences, and there was an absent stance of Moussa al-Sadr (we will refer to these stances as they come). The Iraqi Communist Party had a pro-Baathist status at the time and opposed this march and uprising, “The People's Road” newspaper published articles attacking the uprising and describing it as reactionary, they even asked the communist comrades to cooperate with Baathist comrades, and this situation is documented.

The importance of this uprising comes from the fact that it was the first popular mass movement to roam the streets opposing the Baathist regime, after the fact that the opposition was in the form of secret groups, noting that

the uprising took place in 1977 at a time when the Baathists reached their peak, eliminating opponents locally and globally, they took control of Iraq and ruled it with a fist of iron, following the policy of carrot-and-stick, for anyone who objected or possessed the power to say (no) to them, only for the Husseini youth to march the streets and challenge the decisions of the authority by saying (no) loudly and fearlessly.

Grand Ayatollah, leader of the Shiite denomination, Sayyid Mohsen al-Hakim, died in 1970, so the scientific seminary was somewhat weakened due to the Baathist government working on weakening the seminary as much as they could, especially after resolving some problems, following the conclusion of the 11th of March agreement by the Kurds in 1970, they concluded with the Shah of Iran the famous Algiers Agreement, and then solved their problem with the Communists through the so-called National Front, to devote their attention to the Islamic movement to arrest and deport young believers, as well as those who escaped their oppression, they executed a group of jihadists, such as Sheikh Aref al-Basri and his colleagues, transitioning into the position of force that enabled them to strike the Husseini processions.

This blessed uprising was not known to many outside Iraq, even to many Iraqis, especially young people, to have heard of it without knowing its causes, nature, what happened to it and its effects... It has even been forgotten for a lot of years, and hasn't been scientifically documented, although a number of articles have been written about it in some newspapers and magazines, and some short television programs were made, where everyone talked about the events they have witnessed, or certain aspects of them, without these conversations being comprehensive of the events or properly documented.

One important reason I see is that many people don't know about this uprising, is that the media, whether audible, visual or written, didn't highlight it, even after the fall of the regime in Iraq, despite having many Shiite satellite channels. This may be because the uprising was independent and didn't follow any particular political party!

Another reason is that some of its speakers tried to confiscate it and attributed it to its non-real parents, some of whom claimed that this uprising belonged to a

particular Islamic entity, and others claimed that it belonged to a cleric, for example, the leader of the scientific seminary, or certain najafi families, I had seen someone who claimed to be the owner of the uprising! These and other reasons have contributed to the fact that many Iraqis and non-Iraqis aren't aware of this uprising.

We were blessed to have been able to write a book about this uprising, printed two or three months ago, containing 800 pages, after collecting all the documents related to this uprising, and the articles and broadcasts about it from television programs, albeit few, as well as the documents we obtained related to the Directorate of Public Security, the Directorate of Security of Najaf, the report written by Dr. Azza Mustafa, president of the court that was composed to try the violators, and other documents that revealed many facts of the uprising to us, arranged in chronological order, which also proves that this uprising wasn't affiliated with any party, and it was a public uprising, after the Baath authority prevented the Hussein public from marching to Karbala to visit the Holy Shrine of Imam Hussein on the 40th anniversary, they informed the procession's owners in Najaf about that at the beginning of the holy month of Muharram in 1397 Hijri (1977 AD); so

the Hussein public thought about how to go on foot to Karbala despite the ban, then it all went downhill from there, after they prepared the requirements of this uprising, including a large banner that read "**The hand of God is above their hands**", and began the mass mobilization secretly to participate in this Husseinian march.

I devoted a whole chapter in my book to the start of the uprising on Friday, the 10th of February 1977, or the 15th of Safar 1397 Hijri, as I was one of the participants, first going to the Holy Shrine of Imam Ali, where the numbers of participants began to increase, then we went to Imam Ali Arena in the province of Isfahan, leading us to Karbala Road. The participants spent their first night in Khan al-Ruba (khan quarter), as is customary in this Hussein March, The second night was in Khan al-Nusf, the third in Khan al-Nakhila, then came the entrance to Holy Karbala on the fourth day.

The slogans raised in the meantime were purely related to Imam Hussein, in proportion to the nature of the occasion, including: "even if they cut off our legs and hands, we will crawl to you Sayyid Hussein." The Baathists tried to break

through the march, but they couldn't, because the risers were so careful that they agreed on a password between them (mosquito) in case of Baathists presence between them. On the second day before reaching Khan al-Nusf, the Baathists tried to shoot the unarmed participants, to get them to return to Najaf, and on the third day, which happened on Sunday, 6th of February, after leaving Khan al-Nusf to Khan al-Nakhila, several important events took place, as Baath forces also fired shots, which led to the martyrdom of a 14-year-old boy, Abdul Amir al-Mayali, and the martyrdom of a Lebanese woman, according to martyr Sayyid Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim (May God rest his soul). The situation began to worsen after the youth was shot while being unarmed, which led the risers to chant political slogans.

The authority sent a delegation from the province of Karbala when the march arrived in Khan al-Nakhila, but the Husseini youth refused to meet with them, then they were sent another delegation from the province of Najaf to persuade them to return to Najaf and to not enter Karbala, but this delegation's mission also failed.

The Iraqi government then asked Najaf Governor Jassim al-Rikabi to assign someone to mediate this matter with Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei and Sayyid Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr, Sayyid al-Khoei didn't agree while Sayyid al-Sadr was convinced. He instructed Sayyid Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim to go to Khan Al-Nakhila, talk to the Husseini youth to calm them down, because the Governor of Najaf told Sayyid al-Sadr that the government had reversed its decision to prevent young people from going to Karbala, and they could continue their march on the condition of not chanting slogans against the state, Although Sayyid Hakim considered this governmental offer to be a maneuver to buy time and pounce on the risers, most of whom were arrested in Prison No. 1 at Camp al-Rasheed and tortured by various means of torment. Sayyid Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim was arrested on Thursday, February 10th, 21st of Safar at the home of the poet Dr. Mustafa Jamal al-Din, Mr. Jamal al-Din says that the Governor of Najaf Jassim al-Rikabi contacted him asking him to invite Sayyid Hakim to his house for a consultative session on the situation, and when Sayyid al-Hakim arrived, a number of security officers broke into Mr. Jamal al-Din's house, arrested Sayyid Mohammed Baqir and took

him to the General Security Directorate in Baghdad, where he was sentenced to life imprisonment. He was informed of the verdict while in the Directorate of Public Security, without even witnessing at court. Sayyid Mahmoud al-Khatib told me that the Director of Public Security Fadel al-Barrak summoned the martyr Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr to his office in Baghdad for questioning, two days after the arrest of Sayyid Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim, on the twenty-third day of Safar.

It should be noted in this regard that a number of Iraqi figures visited Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, his deputy Saddam Hussein, the Governor of Karbala and the Director of Security, to denounce this matter and show their support for the State, some of them sent messages of support for the authority's actions against the risers.

Sayyid Abu al-Qassim al-Khoei was informed that the government intended to execute many of the participants in the uprising and impose maximum penalties on others; he decided to send a delegation with a letter from him to Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr. Sayyid al-Khoei asked martyr Sayyid Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr to head this delegation, but Sayyid al-Sadr apologized declining this

task; stating that such an order may be considered supportive of the Baathist regime, and the authority wouldn't respond to the demands of the delegation, which prompted some distinguished members of the scientific seminary to apologize for not participating in this delegation, considering the sensitivity and gravity of the situation.

Six people participated in the delegation: Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Khoei (son of Grand Ayatollah Sayyid al-Khoei), Sheikh Mohammed Jawad al-Sheikh Radhi (father of Sheikh Hadi al-Radhi), Mr. Hussein Bahr al-Uloom, Mr. Abdul Rasul Ali Khan, Mr. Mohammed Taqi al-Jalali, Dr. Mustafa Jamal al-Din, Sayyid al-Khoei made his son Sayyid Jamal al-Din head of the delegation. Martyr Al-Sadr's opinion was to let Mr. Mustafa Jamal al-Din be the head speaker, although Sayyid Jamal al-Din was the head of the delegation, but he wasn't a compelling speaker, especially in such situations. The delegation, headed by Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Khoei, went and met with the Iraqi President al-Bakr at 6 p.m. on Tuesday, February 22nd, 1977 AD.

Mr. Mustafa Jamal al-Din spoke about what happened in this meeting to martyr al-Sadr, describing it as

disappointing, pointing out the good decision that al-Sadr made by not participating in the delegation, al-Bakr attacked Najafis calling them horrible names, describing them as enemies of the revolution and enemies of the government, so on and so forth.

On Wednesday morning, February 23rd, 1977, the Revolutionary Command Council issued a statement to try the risers, whom the statement described as the ones who carried out the riots.

The court consisted of three people: Dr. Azza Mustafa, Minister of Municipalities as President, Falih Hassan al-Jassim, Minister of State, and Hassan Ali al-Ameri. Eight people were sentenced to death, fifteen were imprisoned and the rest were released without legal proceedings, then it turned out that the president of the court Azza Mustafa and Falih Hassan al-Jassim were objecting to these adjudications, so they were arrested and dismissed from the party.

Some supreme leaders and scholars sent telegrams denouncing these adjudications to the Iraqi president, asking him to use his powers to repeal them.

The Politburo of the Communist Party issued a statement attacking the uprising, describing it as "sectarian religious activity against national authority". More than forty-five documents have been substantiated in my book on the uprising, to which reference has been made.

The uprising left Iraqis with so much pain that some Baathists were affected by the harshness of these judgments, and some reacted, but the authority was too powerful to let anyone speak against it. Ruling the country with fists of fire and iron, so no one could've said no to the Baathists at that time! And yet, I pray that I was successful in speaking about the blessed uprising of Safar, asking God's forgiveness for all of us, may peace, mercy and blessings be upon you all.

Thank you his eminence Sheikh for this valuable lecture, and now ladies and gentlemen we open the door for questions:

Sheikh Abdul Halim al-Zuhairi

I listened and enjoyed this lecture, it was a special effort in which Sheikh al-Hassoun expressed loyalty to the heroes of the uprising.... I would like to comment on the case of

the arrest of martyr Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, I have doubts about this information, and I believe there is confusion between this event and the events of the 17th of Rajab 1399 Hijri in which martyr al-Sadr was arrested.

Sheikh Mohammed al-Hassoun:

The arrest of martyr al-Sadr in 1977 is confirmed, and has been mentioned by many authors who wrote about his life, including martyr Muhammed Baqir al-Hakim and Sheikh al-Numani, as well as Mr. Mahmoud al-Khatib who visited me personally in Qom, and told me that Sayyid al-Sadr was arrested in the morning and released sometime in the afternoon or evening....

Sheikh Mohammed al-Kurbasi peace be upon you, may God bless and reward you all

1. What are the causes of the uprising of Safar? Are they political or ideological reasons?
2. Why didn't the Hussainian processions comply and visit by vehicles rather than on foot?
3. Were the results of such a challenge equitable and equal?

4. Has the uprising been taken advantage of politically?

5. Was the uprising spontaneous or planned?

Sheikh Mohammed al-Hassoun:

1. I have indicated that the people who made this uprising were the Husseini youth, who didn't belong to a certain political party, making the reasons of the uprising purely ideological, even though it got mingled into the political side, for the reasons mentioned above, especially after the behavior of the participants got suppressed.

2. Since the Baathists came to power in 1968, they banned the procession of college students in 1969; since the Islamic Dawa Party is a political party, directing this procession. The Baathists were playing it smart, as there was no reaction from the Husseini masses, because the Iraqis viewed this procession as a political procession rather than a Husseini procession. In 1971-1972 the Shiite ritual of wounding the head was banned, but Najafis did it anyway and got arrested, Then they forbade torches and solace processions were prevented little by little, until the ban included walking to Karbala on the 40th anniversary of Imam Hussein, peace be upon him, they viewed the

situation as a challenge. If it wasn't for the uprising, the Baathists would have gone too far with the ban; therefore we see them retreating after the events of 1977, paving the way for Hussein rituals to return.

3. We can't say that the uprising was spontaneous or planned by some political parties, noticing its level of organization, we could see some of its aspects at the meetings held by the owners of processions in the month of Muharram after they were informed of the walk ban, as well as the preparation of the requirements to go out to Karbala and how to behave with the authority, the location and time of the March, and the management of some service affairs that we witnessed on the way to Karbala.

4. The importance of this uprising comes from several things, including: it is the first popular mass movement to roam the streets opposing the Baathist regime. Yes, there was opposition to the regime before this, but it was done secretly. This uprising took place in 1977 at a time when the Baathists reached their peak, taking control of Iraq and ruling it with fists of iron and fire, pursuing the policy of carrot-and-stick, and no one stood up to them except the

Husseini youth, defying the decisions of the brute authority.

Dr. Torhan al-Mufti

Do you think that unscheduled and uncoordinated popular movements/uprisings can produce a positive outcome in the displacement of any regime, or should they be planned and organized?

Sheikh Mohammed al-Hassoun:

The aim of this uprising wasn't to overthrow the Baathist regime, but to go to Karbala on foot and perform the visit on the 40th anniversary of Imam Hussein (peace be upon him), so the slogans in the first two days of the uprising weren't political, but pure Husseini, but then the Husseini public chanted some political slogans, after the Baathists shot them, and the political slogans mingled with Husseini slogans.

There was no plan prepared in advance to overthrow the regime, so how could a spontaneous popular uprising bring down a bloody dictatorial regime ruling its people with fists of fire and iron?

Mohammed al-Shukri

Peace be upon you, please clarify the association of the uprising with the youth, who are its most prominent leaders? Was it a deliberate and externally supported uprising by exploiting the prohibition of Husseinian rituals, or was it purely Husseinian?

Sheikh Mohammed al-Hassoun:

This uprising was never supported externally, and there is no evidence of that happening.

Plus who wanted to displace the system at that time? It is the Husseinian people, and I detailed that in this lecture and in my book.

They talked about how they prepared the supplies for the uprising, collected some funds to buy simple supplies, such as cloth for banners or some inexpensive equipment, most professionals don't receive a wage for the work they do to revive these rituals, such as the calligrapher who wrote the large banner which displayed the saying of God: (**The hand of God is above their hands**), etc..

Dr. Ahmad al-Mayyali

1. Is there a definitive perspective and position of the international community/organizations on the regime's methods of suppressing the uprising?
2. Did the regime's cruelty in suppressing the uprising incriminate the regime internationally, whether in the years of opposition or in the years after the fall of the regime in 2003?
3. Is there a correlation between this uprising and the 1979 revolution in Iran?

Sheikh Mohammed al-Hassoun:

1. There was no international position on the uprising, because the Baathist regime had a strong media blackout on its events, even when it was talked about in the news, the regime was accusing the Syrian government of it, the regime made up a spectacle that the Syrian government is trying to blow up the sanctuary of imam Hussein, they arrested a person named (Mohammed Ali Naanaa) and interviewed him on television where he spoke about wanting to bomb the sanctuary of Imam Hussein on the 8th of February, a day after the Husseini youth were

arrested in Khan-Nakhila, the regime accused the Syrian government of performing riot acts in Najaf and the road leading from Najaf to Karbala. There have been little stances made by the international community to the uprising and its suppression, even Iran during the reign of Shah Mohammed Pahlavi, didn't refer to the uprising in their media whatsoever, because they had a good relationship with the Iraqi government at the time.

2. These crimes committed by the Baathist regime against the uprising haven't been put on the record, and even today the Iraqi Media unfortunately hasn't dealt with them, albeit with a documentary film about what happened.

3. This uprising took place in 1977, while the Islamic Revolution broke out in Iran in 1978-a year later. Our uprising was purely spontaneous, in order to commemorate the 40th anniversary of Imam Hussein, while the Islamic Revolution in Iran was to replace the regime and topple the Shah's power at the time.

Dr. Asad Shabib

Peace be upon you, what benefits from the uprising of Safar can still be utilized in the Shiite experience after 2003?

Sheikh Mohammed al-Hassoun:

The Husseini public came out against the unjust Baathist regime, unarmed, where they sacrificed themselves in commemoration of the 40th anniversary of Imam Hussein, peace be upon him, not for money or fame. The millions of visits we are witnessing today are only the fruit of that pure blood that was spilled in that blessed uprising.

Rafea Abel Jabbar

Dr. Ali al-Momen stated in his book (years of embers) that the state accused the Dawa Party of being behind this uprising, did the Dawa Party actually have an initial or subsequent role in this uprising, especially that the martyr Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr supported and sponsored it, and sent Sayyid Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim to the risers as his representative, or did this move of Sayyid Baqir al-Sadr come to contain the uprising , without the Dawa party having a role in it?

Sheikh Mohammed al-Hassoun:

The state accused the Syrian regime primarily to be behind what they called acts of riot in Najaf, there are some reports that were issued by some Baathists referring to the Dawa party, but I couldn't find through my research any evidence that clearly demonstrates that the Islamic Dawa party is behind this uprising. The party may have supported it and had a number of preachers participate in it, as the late Mr. Raad al-Kharsan points out in what he wrote about the uprising where he participated in personally, in the sense that there was no leadership of the Dawa party for this uprising, nor any other Islamic political party, And those who got arrested, executed and imprisoned were simple people, not highly educated, so there is no evidence of what you have asked for.

Martyr Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr (may he Rest In Peace) was a supporter of every movement against the regime, but there is no evidence that he oversaw, instigated or contributed to this uprising.

Dr. Yehea al-Kabisi

Do you agree that the uprising of Safar contributed to the consolidation of the sectarian conflict in Iraq, which has been forcibly suppressed throughout the previous eras of Iraq's modern history; because of the Sunni nature of the state, especially after some writers based their perspective of this sectarian mindset that appeared in some writings in the 1990s, right up to the declaration of a Shiite Iraq?

Sheikh Mohammed al-Hassoun:

We can't describe the decision issued by the leadership of the Baath party to ban the Husseinite rites as a 100 percent sectarian decision. Rather, it was a political decision. The Baath doesn't want any movement or grouping to compete with it, It only wants Iraqis to be subordinate to it. After the party controlled the Iraqi people with fists of iron and fire and resolved its issues with other problematic parties, there was no movement outside its control other than the Husseinite rituals . Yes, there was a sectarian existence among some Baath party leaders, such as Khairallah Talfah, who was expressing his sectarian views, as well as some officials in the Iraqi government who had

some influence on the Baath leadership at the time, but this is only a small percentage, not a 100 percent.

Dr. Mohammed Hussein Mirza

Peace, mercy and blessings of God be upon you

My question to your eminence is: did the supreme leaders of the holy Najaf and martyr Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim have a role in organizing and supporting this uprising?

Sheikh Mohammed al-Hassoun:

I mentioned this before, the supreme leaders and the scientific seminary had no role in organizing, conducting and supervising this uprising. The supreme leaders and the scientific seminary are the sponsors, and supporters of the Husseini rituals. We have been told that they initiated the sending of delegations and telegrams to the government when the brute authority issued death sentences and imprisonment against a large number of participants in the uprising...

Martyr Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim is part of the scientific seminary, and he sponsored and supported the Husseini

rituals, and I have found no evidence of his role in organizing, supervising or conducting this uprising...

Finally, I greatly thank all the professors who participated in this session, may peace, mercy and blessings of God be upon you all.

Q / Did the government's reaction on the uprising of Safar come as a surprise or was it following a certain policy?

A/ The government’s stance on visiting the Holy Shrine of Imam Hussein and preventing it comes in the context of the anti-religious policy pursued by the Baath Party, and can be summed up by a set of points:

1. Early hostility from the Baath Party to the Islamic movement: This hostility dates back to before the Baathists came to power in 1968, and may have existed since 1960, when the Baathists launched an attack on “The Lights” magazine and promoted the idea that the people behind the magazine are in a secret religious organization.
2. The opportunism of the Baath Party, which was opportunistic in order to achieve its objectives/goals, in a certain period they supported Islamic movements to limit communist influence between 1958-1960, after they

weakened and broke up the communists, the Baathists started to take down islamists, after February 1963 they allied with nationalists, remnants of the Istiqlal Party and some associations, then after 1968 they returned to their alliance with the Communists against the Islamists.

3. The Baath Party's secularism and its association with outlandish agendas, the Baath Party adopted nationalism, a secular movement far from religion, On the other hand, the party was linked to British and American intelligence agendas, as one of the most prominent leaders of the 1968 coup, Hardan al-Tikriti, points out in his memoirs.

4. Fighting the Scientific Seminary : the Baathists since coming had the goal of fighting the scientific seminary, and this goal is related to their desire to eliminate forces that have the ability to stand up to them, It is known that the scientific seminary is the only entity to which millions of Iraqis owe their allegiance to, and are able to reject the decisions of the unjust authority at that time, thus, the regime wanted to liquidate the seminary. Several steps have been taken in that regard, including expelling foreign students from the seminary in order to weaken it, not exempting students of the seminary from military service,

accusing students of the scientific seminary with espionage to Iran, and a lot of other measures aimed at weakening this important scientific entity.

5. Fighting the Husseini rituals, Baathists since their arrival to power have fought the Husseini rituals and the consolation councils, one of the first rituals they fought is the visit of the Holy Shrine of Imam Hussein, so they justified it with several meaningless arguments, such as pruning the rituals or that these visits lead to roads closure or cause traffic accidents/traffic jams and so on.

Q / How many people were detained during the uprising?

A / There is no precise determination of the number of detainees, some estimated 600 people and some believed to be a few thousand or even an estimate of thirty thousand. We must point out that the arrest didn't include only pedestrians but those who provided them with supplies during the march. Furthermore, the arrest included people who weren't related to the uprising whatsoever, such as foreign visitors.

Q / What are the results of the uprising?

1. It has transformed confrontation with the regime from elitist to mass action, so it was a turning point in the process of challenge and change.
2. It was the first blood shed and sacrificed on the ground in a popular confrontation in broad daylight, thus this uprising has moved the fuel of the revolution and the process of change from dark dungeons to the street, making it noticeable by the public opinion.
3. For the first time, the Baathist regime has uncovered the extent of popular rejection of its frivolous policy, which relies on the policy of violating freedoms and shading truths, meanwhile alerting the Iraqi people to the extent of injustice inflicted on them, preparing them to face it.
4. It was the cause of discord in the ranks of the Baath Party, where some of its leadership refused to ratify the death sentences, which were written in advance by the Revolutionary Command Council.
5. This uprising broke the barrier of fear for the masses by entering into a decisive battle with the remnants of the

Baathist regime on the Najaf - Karbala road, which lasted several days in the month of Safar and destroyed the remnants of the unjust regime.

6. The uprising revealed the fake Islamic mask that the Baath Party was masked by.

7. This uprising demonstrated the cohesion of the nation with its decision-making religious hierarchy.

8. After this blessed uprising, more and more young people started performing the Husseini rituals, and visiting the Holy Shrines of Imams and prophets, peace be upon them.

9. This uprising has generated a state of resentment and complaint among some members of the army and police forces.

10. After the uprising, the regime in Baghdad was forced to temporarily withdraw its hands from the Husseini rituals and allow believers to practice them, in order to absorb the wrath of the Iraqis which generated by the practice of violent methods of repression.

Q / What happened between the delegation and al-Bakr?

The conversation, which took place between the members of the delegation and the Iraqi president Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, was conveyed by Mr. Mustafa Jamal al-Din to the martyr Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr in his office, on Wednesday morning, 23rd February 1977, in the presence of Mr. Mahmoud al-Khatib, who thankfully conveyed it to us, as he said: "when the council settled with the Iraqi president, Sayyid Jamal al-Khoei informed al-Bakr of his father's salutation and handed him a letter the Grand Ayatollah Sayyid al-Khoei wrote, so al-Bakr opened it, didn't read it, and handed it to his private escort Tariq Hamad al-Abdullah.

Sayyid Jamal then addressed al-Bakr: "these are your children, and we expect you to have mercy on them," referring to the youth of the uprising detained in government prisons.

Sayyid Jamal remained silent for several seconds, then began his speech, citing the well-known poetic verse

We reigned and amnesty stayed one of our virtues...

He didn't complete the verse, which provoked al-Bakr and angered him, he then addressed Sayyid Jamal telling him to continue, but Sayyid Jamal didn't carry on and remained silent, therefore all members of the delegation did the same.

It is believed that Sayyid Jamal al-Khoei thought that he was doing good by quoting this poetic verse.

So al-Bakr began to attack the people of holy Najaf, and described them as the enemies of the party and the revolution, he also described the youth of the uprising, visitors of Imam Hussein peace be upon him as vandals of the land.

Then, Mr. Mustafa Jamal al-Din intervened to calm the atmosphere, so he grabbed the reins of speech, changing the subject, trying to direct Sayyid al-Khoei Jr intentions, but the Iraqi president remained very upset, and the delegation left with disappointment.

Q / Was there a lack of conviction by some authority figures of the government's decision?

It seemed that two members of the court, Azza Mustafa, its president, and member Falih Hassan al-Jassim, were

unhappy with its decisions, viewing them as unfair. They may have objected to those decisions before the court, as they were showing signs of dissatisfaction during the court.

What supports this is the fact that the court’s decisions were decided by one of its members and not by its president, as is customary in all trials, who lowered his head, next to him sat the other member of the court, Falih Hassan al-Jassim, leaning against the wall and fiddling with his hair.

After the court ended, they were arrested for allegedly objecting to the court's decisions, subsequently dismissed from the party leadership, and displaced from their official positions.

Seminar (The political and kinetic effects of the 1977 immortal uprising of “Safar”. On the 40th anniversary of Imam Hussein -(peace be upon him)- a documentary reading of its events)

Sheikh Abdul Halim al-Zuhairi

Peace be upon you, brothers.... I thank the management of this seminar for giving us the opportunity to talk about the uprising of Safar, the popular uprising that started from the city of Najaf in 1977, and as we talk about this uprising, it draws us to talk about its roots. We're not going to delve into the history that was thoroughly researched and scrutinized in yesterday's lecture, but I'm going to talk about what the title of the seminar suggests “The political and kinetic effects of the 1977 immortal uprising of Safar. On the 40th anniversary of Imam Hussein -(peace be upon him)- a documentary reading of its events”.

To find out its effects it is necessary to know its roots, for example, when we want to look at the revolution of Imam Hussein, we should know the roots and reasons for this revolution from the beginning of the era of Islam, then the era of the caliphate and what came to it during the reign of Muawiyah and Yazid, etc.

The book (Revolution of Imam Hussein, a study and analysis) written by the late intellectual Sheikh Mehdi Shams al-Din is considered one of the most valuable books written about the revolution of Imam Hussein, peace be

upon him, because he stripped this great revolution to its origins and roots from one side and its effects from the other, and analyzed it in a consciously political way, and that’s good for us, while we are talking about the popular uprising not as facts or events that took place in a certain place and time, but we must discern its roots and link between its causes, results and effects, so we will discuss events prior to the uprising, during the uprising, and then after the uprising , God willing.

When injustice invades any place in any time there will be reactions, and these responses are either religious, political or humanitarian, and religion in its nature rejects injustice, because religion came to delight people and spread justice, as God Almighty is just and commands justice, there are legitimate provisions of justice that have legitimate effects on testimonies and narration...As stated in the Hadith: "the best jihad is the word of truth against an unjust Sultan", and as stated in the prayer of Imam Zain al-Abidin: “God, forgive me for any injustice happened in my presence and I couldn’t have prevented it”. There are a lot of stories and religious teachings, all against injustice.

The origin of jihad is a revolution over injustice, tyranny, and so on, there is a vilification of the preachers of Sultans, Court scholars and others, and everything that contradicts religion and the lofty principles that they seek to establish in society.

Therefore, it isn't surprising that there are reactions against injustice, because injustice is contrary to human instinct, and all religions do not accept injustice, although there are variations in things that lead to injustice.

The Universal declarations of human rights are based on the rejection of injustice, as are the organizations founded on that principle, all calling for justice and equality.

There is political backlash because injustice provides the ground for a political opponent; that is when a person wants to rise against a particular person, party or entity...he exploits the cause of the injustice of that regime, ruler, party or person, to provoke people against them.

When the Baathists came to power they began to fight their opponents in general, religious ones in particular, especially against the scientific seminary and religious

hierarchy, a despicable and dictatorship fight, when they collided with the religious hierarchy on the case of Sayyid Mehdi al-Hakim between 1969-1970, they accused him of spying with Abdul Hussein Giteh, a Shi'ite merchant, and his ilk in Basra, they were executed in a known case and a mock trial, then began the secret internal education of the Baath Party against religion, which resulted in the arrest of some religious civilians, including Haj Saheb Dakhil (Abu Essam), from a well-known Najafi family, he was one of the important leaders of the Dawa Party, a companion of scholars and supreme leaders, he was also close to Sayyid Mohsen al-Hakim and Sayyid Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr, Abu Essam was executed by being dissolved in Aqua regia (a mixture of nitric acid and hydrochloric acid) at al-Nihaya Palace by the criminal Nazim Kesar, who was responsible for these executions, then they executed the five martyrs in 1974, they were: Sheikh Aref al-Basri, Mr. Imad al-Tabrizi, Mr. Izz al-Din al-kabanji, Mr. Nuri Ta'mah and Mr. Hussein Glukhan, these executions of religious people that were carried out by the Baath was the first action against religion and the scientific seminary and religious hierarchy.

But the Baathists fight didn't include religious folks only, it extended to the Kurds and some Sunni scholars who were

executed, such as Sheikh Abdul Aziz al-Badri and his brother Muhammad al-Badri, even some Baathist leaders were killed for various charges, such as defection and conspiracy against the regime.

This Baathist oppression, which has been evident to many people, has created an innate sense among the people that this government isn't about the people; because they were against religion and against public freedoms, they forced people to enter unions that followed the party, to participate in the elections organized by the party, they also gave Baathists many advantages.

The regime then began to restrict the public performance of the Husseini rituals, and when the regime found no justification for suppressing those who performed them, they blamed them for opposing the regime, political affiliation or conspiracy... However, the Baathists sometimes avoided being subjected to ritual abuse as required by their interests; so they would be guaranteed that the vast majority of the masses wouldn't rise up against them.

The Islamic Movement played a role in the 1977 uprising, and I don't mean a particular Islamic party, but rather the

Islamic Movement, and this movement went through several stages, in 1957 the Islamic Dawa Party was founded and began to spread, in conjunction with the extension of Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Mohsen al-Hakim's influence in the governorates, by opening libraries and sending agents to different regions, Sayyid Al-Hakim was known for his openness to society, he was from a well-known Najafi family, and his sons played an active role in the Najafi scientific seminary, the implementation of his informative religious project inside and outside Iraq, after Sayyid Al-Hakim's resourcefulness extended to the Islamic world. Years later, the accumulated work of the Islamic experience produced an Islamic awareness, which began to spread little by little through various means, including radio and television, through the lectures of Sheikh Ahmed al-Waeli, As well as the role of a number of scholars and poets of the scientific seminary, such as Mr. Mustafa Jamal al-Din, through the establishments of festivals and the revival of major religious celebrations, such as the birth celebration of Imam Ali and Imam Hussein, peace be upon them, in addition, the role of the Islamic Movement in spreading awareness among the nation has emerged, although the platform of Sheikh al-Waeli wasn't

revolutionary and was more of a platform that gave people a religious and cultural momentum, which spread an Islamic atmosphere in the community, especially after it extended to Baghdad to al-Khelani mosque and al-Hashemi mosque, As well as a number of distinguished orators in other regions, such as Sheikh Hilali and Sheikh Majid al-Sumairi, and among the youth Mr. al-Qamousi and Mr. Amer al-Helou, and other scholars, writers and orators who were distinguished by their missionary activity in spreading Islamic awareness and culture, including the well-known orator martyr Jawad Shbr, who was bold in urging young people to rise during the 1970s and the uprising of that decade, and to show Husseini sentiments, along with him, his religious sons were working in the Islamic Movement, some of whom are preachers who played an active role in this regard.

In addition to the above, the religious hierarchy of martyr Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr became widely known in the 70's, his students began to spread in different places, They were distinguished students such as: Sayyid Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim, son of a supreme leader who is also mature and knowledgeable, Sayyid Mahmoud Al-Hashemi Al-Shahroudi, one of Sayyid al-Khoei's authorized

representatives, Sayyid Kazim Al-Haeri, now a well-known supreme leader, Sheikh Mohammed Baqirz Al-Nasser in Nasiriyah, Sheikh Mahdi Al-Samawi in al-Samawah, and Sheikh Mir Mohammed Al-Qazwini in Basrah, these were the assistants of martyr al-Sadr in all regions and governorates, not to mention the Najaf Seminary and its scholars and preachers being known for their knowledge superiority, which paved the way for the Blessed uprising of Safar.

As we are talking about this referral and kinetic role of religious scholars and orators, that doesn't mean that the leadership of the uprising had been limited to these scholars, instead this elite groups formed a solid ground for movement towards resistance to the oppression and tyranny of the ruling regime at that time; therefore The Dawa Party set the stage for breaking the fear barrier of the authority's oppression, The kinetic hierarchy led by Sayyid Mohsen al-Hakim and al-Sadr was working to raise social awareness, it increased willpower and momentum to move against the authority, otherwise, the system was starting to oppress the people even harder.

So it was inevitable that the system must be confronted by men of great faith, awareness, courage, willpower and determination.

We don't want to take credit for the efforts of those who carried out the uprising, but at the same time we don't want to be underestimating those who mapped out a way for such movements before the uprising, for example there was a small mosque called Masjid al-Sadeq located at the beginning of al-Sadeq street from the upper Haram side, someone built it and left someplace else, and the task of serving this mosque was entrusted to Haj Abdul salawat.

As small as this mosque was, it was in an important location, a group of young people used to meet there before the uprising, including Abu Mahdi al-Rukabi son of Haj Abdul salawat, who supported them financially.

This mosque became one of the Centers of religious activities in that area, it couldn't fit the rising number of people anymore, so al-Rukabi bought a house in al-Haweish area from a doctor currently living in Ireland, he is the son of Mr. Abdullah Saleh, who was a representative of Sayyid Mohsen al-Hakim in Hilla, and then a

representative of Sayyid al-Sadr and Sayyid al-Khoei, he then travelled to al-Ahsa and then to Qatar where he died a while ago, his son still lives in Ireland and has known religious activities.

This house was used for the activities of young people, preachers and Islamists who helped in one way or another prepare for the uprising, among them were preachers such as: Abu Mahdi al-Rukabi, Mohammed Hussein al-Sayyid Mohi al-Ghareifi, Saad Abdulrazaq Rajeeb, Karam Abdulrazak Rajeeb, Salam al-Talqani brother of Mr. Mohammed al-Talqani, Hamed shabr, Amin shabr, Mohammed Ali al-Jabri and his brothers, Sayyid Raad al-Kharsan, who wrote a book about the uprising of Safar, and was one of the activists in the uprising, and Sheikh Ali merzah, most of these were martyred as preachers, may God have mercy on their souls, although their work wasn't in the name of the party, because their activity was secretive.

We must mention the big role of many young people who didn't work under the patronage of a particular party, as others claim, and we mustn't state that all partisans were against or away from it all, because the uprising was a

public Husseinite issue, where everyone sympathized with it, albeit in different ways.

The uprising of Safar was the first of its kind in Iraq, where it emerged after the Baathist authority prevented the Husseinite rites; this ban was one of the most prominent signs of defiance against Shiites, their religious hierarchy and their rituals, hence, the uprising was timed to deter the authority from further repression and persecution, and despite the fear that many people had, the uprising of Safar forced the authority to recalculate in religious matters and issues that fall within this scope, thus the uprising was a huge event, timed correctly.

Effects of the uprising

1. This uprising revealed the falsity of power that tried to portray itself as pro-religion and accused communists of being anti-religion, there was no doubt that the disclosure of falsehood was absolutely necessary for many, who felt that the Baath wasn't against religion.
2. The rift that took place within the Baath Party, because many Baathists thought that their party was pro-religion,

yes it might be a secular party but it didn't despise religion, thus the uprising proved them wrong.

3. The uprising has given impetus to religious people to approach the public encouraging them to rise against the authority, and if it didn't require a fight, armed confrontation and massive demonstrations, al-Husseini's cause has prepared them for action, in order to react and avenge Imam Hussein (peace be upon him).

4. The uprising gave a warning to Islamic parties that the authority is cruel, and if it dealt with risers and unarmed visitors who came in a peaceful manner chanting pure Husseini slogans so harshly, how will they deal with opposing parties? Therefore, it is necessary to be precise and confidential, and to accommodate the community more to form a public balance to protect the party's movement, so the uprising of Safar became a study material , in terms of its nature, influence and suppression by the authorities .

5. The uprising helped the Husseini youth open up to scholars and conscious religious people, and narrowed the gap between the elite and the public, as brute authorities doesn't take into account social differences (a supreme

leader, an educated person, a politician, a worker, and other social classes), thus ritual manifestations have become targeted by authorities, which has over time led to integration of social classes and facilitated Islamic action.

6. One of the manifestations of the rift caused by the uprising in the Baath Party was the result of the committee formed by the former regime including three ministers: Azza Mustafa, Falih Hassan al-Jassim and Hassan al-Ameri, after two of them, Azza and Falih, didn't agree to the pre-prepared resolutions against the uprising, resulting in their displacement from the office and their dismissal from the Baath Party, although they were party leaders.

The late Sayyid Abdul Wahab al-Talqani was one of the martyrs who played a major role in the uprising and was executed inside the prison before being sentenced, according to his fellow prisoners, he played an active role in the uprising and was one of its leaders. There were a lot of diversity in martyrs of the uprising which has provided some support, in addition to Sayyid Abdel Wahab, among those executed was: Abbas Ajina, Kamel Naji Malo, Mohammed Saeed al-Balaghi, Saheb Rahim Abu Kalal,

Yousuf al-Assadi, Najah Mohammed Karim al-Mashhadi, Abdul Karim Khoir, Mohammed al-Mayali, and others all belonging to families of different classes, which led to more mass cohesion and sympathy for the tyranny they suffered, which led in return to the rift in the Baath Party and undermined the confidence in the party among those who believed in it, including a senior political official, left the Party after the uprising was suppressed.

I had participated in the uprising and then took the path of the agricultural road, because scholars and students of religious sciences, before the events of the uprising , went to their clans to inform them and teach them about their religion, then many of the risers joined us, hence we heard the voices of airplanes breaking the sound barrier in a terrifying way.

7. The supreme leaders sympathized publicly with people, they were wise and balanced in their stances, didn't act hastily or emotionally, such as public mobilization, urging demonstrations and public movements against the authority in an emotional or unplanned manner, due to their calculations of the overall circumstances in its general context and religious status, but that doesn't

mean that they remained silent about persecution, so martyr al-Sadr started taking actions, and assigned Sayyid Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim while Sayyid al-Khoei sent his son and a group of scholars to commute sentences, release detainees and stop the arrest campaign by the authorities.

Sayyid Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim had a supportive attitude to the uprising, met with risers in Khan al-Nakhila, and endured the reactions of enthusiastic risers who thought he was sent by the authority to discourage their resolve, while Sayyid Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr was sentenced to life imprisonment, and then released from prison several years later, so there was sympathy and synergy between the supreme leaders and the rising public, which gave impetus to the Islamic movement to move openly against the authorities.

8. In addition to all of what was said before, we mention the sympathy of the Iraqi tribes, which welcomed visitors before and during the uprising, considering that the housing of these visitors is a victory for the cause of Imam Hussein (peace be upon him).

All these consequences and effects of the uprising are in the interest of religion, although they have produced a state of fear of persecution and repression from the authority, as they hastened to reveal the intentions of the authority and its objectives and policy against religion, and its way of dealing with opponents, even murdering them after they were accused of conspiring with Syria against the regime, upon his arrival at the presidency of the Republic in 1979.

It also revealed the intentions of the authority in the uprising of the 17th of Rajab led by martyr al-Sadr, through the nature of dealing with the opponents, Sayyid al-Sadr was detained in his house for more than ten months, and then executed with his sister Bint al-Huda.

These and other events were the effects of the blessed uprising of Safar led by a group of believers, and it isn't a shame to say that they cooperated with their fellow scholars and preachers, without following a particular religious hierarchy or party, although they all participated in it to varying degrees, to express feelings of love and loyalty to Imam Hussein (peace be upon him), as most of

the Hussein revolutions and uprisings over centuries were.

The Hussein Revolution will remain a beacon for the revolutionaries and those who follow the path of righteousness.

Interventions:

Abdul Razak al-Sultani: Did His Eminence Sayyid Mohsen Hussein Fadlallah play a role in the uprising of Safar?.

Sheikh Abdul Halim al-Zuhairi: In fact, Sheikh Fadlallah was outside Iraq, and he had no role in this uprising, actually not all scholars had a direct role in the uprising, with the exception of martyr al-Sadr and Sayyid Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim, who was an envoy of Sayyid al-Sadr, and his meeting with the risers had two explanations allegedly: the first was that his meeting with the risers would have calmed them down, and the second was that Sayyid al-Hakim came as a representative of the authority and worked for it, in fact Sayyid al-Hakim was a supporter of the uprising, walking with the visitors of the Holy Shrine, visiting and supporting some processions.

The religious hierarchy represents Shiites in all their social classes and their intellectual and cultural affiliations, and it's their drive and motive for everything, the religious hierarchy is known to Shiites as being against injustice, seeking justice, as well as its role in spreading religious awareness, especially among tribesmen, some people even send their children to clans for this purpose, and their support for all movements free from injustice and tyranny, directly or indirectly.

Thaer al-Dulaimi: This struggle, which you reviewed is undeniable and we can't forget the martyrs who gave their lives to the sake of justice, and who were inspired by the principles of the revolution of Imam Hussein (peace be upon him) against the unjust ruler, you briefly mentioned al-Nihaya palace (al-Rehab Palace), and because of your closeness to the decision-making center, especially since Mr. Al-Maliki was prime minister for eight years, and then Mr. Abadi for four years, and today Mr. Al-Kazimi... Today, we are witnessing a reform campaign, and nearly 50 people have been arrested so far in al-Rehab palace on the account of the disappearance of 360 billion dollars from Iraq's budgets, and this is what the late Dr. Ahmed Chalabi pointed out in his report to the judges and officials in

charge, is the reform campaign a reform revolution that drew its plan based on reports in this regard?

Sheikh Abdul Halim al-Zuhairi: I’m not close to the decision-making center in this sense, I don’t interfere in administrative issues, my intervention is often limited to political issues, and now I don’t interfere with these issues at all, I have the same problems as you, and maybe even more.

Dr. Asaad Shabib: I have three questions for the honorable Sheikh Abdul Halim al-Zuhairi:

The first question : How does Sheikh Abdul Halim al-Zuhairi evaluate the role of the uprising of Safar against the former Baathist regime?

The second question : Was the intention of the uprising to revive the Husseini rituals or was it intended against the regime itself?

The third question : Do you think that the former regime has used the Islamic intellectual effort to strike its political opponents, particularly the Communist Party, and then pounce on the Islamic movement?

Sheikh Abdul Halim al-Zuhairi: Regarding the first question: I aforementioned that the uprising was an expression of the Baathist regime rejecting and its dictatorship against religion, religious hierarchy, and Hussein rituals.

To answer your second question: the uprising wasn't so much against the state as it was an insistence on reviving the rituals that people have been accustomed to for hundreds of years, yes, it then transformed as a reaction to be against the regime.

As for the third question: The Baathist dictatorship in general is against its opponents, including Baathists who had opposed stances to the regime, as well as against Islamists and religious leaderships, this was the diden of the Baath Party when it was a leading authority.

One of the intervenors: is it right to call the 1977 immortal uprising the true turning point that set the stage for breaking the psychological barrier among Iraqis, or is it another figure added to the revolutions and uprisings that preceded it? And if it is, then why did it take all the cake?

Sheikh Abdul Halim al-Zuhairi: The uprising didn't break the psychological barrier, because it was limited by a

specific time and place, add to that the regime's cruelty and violence by using tanks and planes to suppress and kill the risers, as well as imprison thousands (said to be more than ten thousand detainees), not to mention the executions that terrorized the public.

And although it gave us immunity, it didn't break the barrier of fear in this sense, some people became more fearful.

Thank you all, may peace, mercy and blessings of God be upon you.

The political and kinetic effects of the 1977 immortal uprising of “Safar”



ALL RIGHTS ARE RESERVED FOR AL-RAFIDAIN CENTER FOR DIALOGUE
It may not be copied or republished without written consent by the Center



Iraq Republic – Holy City of Najaf – al-Hawra Neighborhood – Iskan St.



www.alrafidaincenter.com



info@alrafidaincenter.com



009647826222246



P. O. Box. 252